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THE 2008 PRO-IP ACT: THE INADEQUACY OF
THE PROPERTY PARADIGM IN CRIMINAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND ITS
EFFECT ON PROSECUTORIAL BOUNDARIES

"There

has been

a

paradigm

shift.

.

.

but

governments have not kept pace. And the attitudes
and the priorities of the law enforcement
community do not yet reflect the scope and sale that
IP crime has now assumed in today's economy."'

"There is an asymmetry of interests whenever the
choice is between the propertization of intellectual
property and maintenance of the public domain."2

"We are not addressing theoretical concerns with
[the Pro-IP Act], nor are we making grandiose
policy proclamations. We are synthesizing realworld experiences of our many constituents who
develop and monetize intellectual property..,

vindicate those property

to

rights."3

1. Richard Cotton, General Counsel, NBC Universal, Address at the ABA
22nd Annual Intellectual Property Conference: Our Economic Future at Risk:
The Next Steps in the Fight against Intellectual Property Theft (April 13, 2007),
in ABA INAUGURAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, A-5 (2007).
2. Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many IntellectualProperty Rights?,
9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 172, 181 (2005).

3. 154 CONG. REC. S7280-01 (daily ed. July 24, 2008) (statement of Senator
Patrick Leahy introducing the Pro-IP Act).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

1

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

DEPAULJ.ART, TECH. &IPLAW

356

[Vol. XIX:2

I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal penalties are perhaps the most common form of law
enforcement, but in the field of IP, they have been the exception.4
Even in the 1970s, globalization and technological development
signaled the explosion of counterfeited and pirated goods, but the
presumption for remedies remained civil sanctions.
However,
with the formation of the industry lobbying groups that pressured
Congress for change, the last 20 years have seen the enhancement
and expansion of criminal IP laws. 6 In continuation of this trend,
on September 26, 2008, Congress passed the Prioritizing
Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008
("The PRO-IP Act"), reaffirming its mandate to protect the IP
rights of United States industries and businesses. 7 The PRO-IP act
enhances and consolidates criminal penalties in copyright and
trademark law, most notably by creating a new and uniform
forfeiture and impoundment provision to serve as civil and
criminal sanctions for counterfeiting and piracy offenses.8
However, such provisions blur the fundamentally different
purposes and rights of trademark and copyright law, especially in
counterfeiting where an individual can violate both laws. In
trademark, counterfeiting is defined as "a spurious mark which is
identical to, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered
trademark" affixed to goods. 9 In copyright law, using a counterfeit
label -"an
identifying label or container that appears to be
genuine, but is not" - is a criminal offense.1" Therefore, it is
possible for an individual to violate both copyright and trademark
criminal counterfeiting laws. For example, selling illegal copies of
a music record that is labeled with a counterfeit mark of the
recording company is both a copyright and trademark
4. 4

JAY DRATLER JR.

&

STEPHEN M.

MCJOHN,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

§ 13.04 (2008).

5. Id.
6. See generally id.
7. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of

2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.).
8. Id.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).

10. 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2006).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6

2

Pyun: The 2008 PRO-IP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in C

2009]

2008 PRO-IP ACT

counterfeiting offense. Reproducing such counterfeit trademarks
and copyrights is both a form of IP piracy, broadly defined as "the
unauthorized and illegal reproduction or distribution of materials
protected by copyright, patent, or trademark law," can also
implicate both IP infringements."'
Despite such similarities in criminal IP problems,
trademark and copyright law are rooted in different purposes and
the legislation behind each used different justifications and policy
considerations. The question arises whether such consolidation of
IP criminal penalties are appropriate in light of this history.
Because the PRO-IP Act confers upon the federal government an
increased role in detecting and enforcing IP laws, a legal realm
traditionally rooted in the civil arena, governmental authorities
should be conscious of these differences because the government
not only reflects society's normative values of the law, but also
have the power to define the boundaries of the law.
The first part of this article discusses the common-law and
historical development of Congress's initiatives against copyright
and trademark counterfeiting as well as the United States
government's response in the twenty-first century to illustrate how
the 2008 PRO-IP Act arises out of this legal tradition. The second
part of this article explains the provisions of the new Act and its
amendments of the existing criminal IP statutes and how Congress
uses the PRO-IP Act to advance its policy of protecting IP owners.
This article next examines the underlying assumption known as the
"property paradigm," which shapes Congressional policy of the
PRO-IP Act and is reflected in the Act's emphasis on forfeiture
and restitution as criminal enforcement tools. Finally, this article
concludes that the use of these penalties blur the boundaries
between civil and criminal IP proceedings, raising problematic
implications for the Department of Justice's prosecutorial authority
and ultimately undermining its role as guarantor of IP rights but
also protector of public access.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1186 (8th ed. 2004). Pirated trademarks
today have also been used in the context of "cyberpiracy"- refers to the
deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of Internet domain names
utilizing distinct or famous trademarks in violation of the trademark owner's
rights, often forcing the owners to pay for the right to engage in electronic
commerce under their own brand names. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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II. BACKGROUND
The legal history of copyright and trademark counterfeiting
demonstrate the different purposes and justifications for legislative
regulation and serves as a backdrop for the modem convergence of
criminal IP statutes and the government's increasing shift toward
approaching IP violations with criminal penalties. This section
first contains a short history of the legal development of criminal
IP law, then briefly outlines the criminal IP statutes in place today.
This section finally summarizes the federal government's major
initiatives to enforce criminal IP law leading up to the passage of
the 2008 PRO-IP Act.
A. History of Copyright and Trademark Counterfeiting

Although the PRO-IP Act seeks to converge and standardize
criminal penalties for IP offenses, copyright and trademark law
have had two very different legal histories. In the latter twentieth
century, however, both areas in enforcement increasingly
converged as criminal penalties became broader and harsher for all
types of IP infringement.
1. Copyright

Copyright protection in United States common law was rooted
in the protection of the artistic and literary rights of individuals. In
seventeenth century England, the term "piracy" was widely used to
describe the unauthorized printing of books.12 Indeed, with the
invention of the printing press in the sixteenth century, book piracy
flourished and the government's attempt to stem this piracy trade
played an important role in the development of modem copyright
law.' 3 In 1710, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne 4 to
prevent book piracy by granting authors the exclusive right to print
12. Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies:Of Piracy,
Propertization,and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 993, 1009 (2006).
13. PAUL

R.

PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING: PRODUCT PIRACY,

AND THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 15 (1999).
14. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at

http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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and distribute their works.15 The Statute was a response not only to
domestic piracy but also the threat of pirated imported books from
Scotland, which joined in union with England in 1707, and, unlike
England, did not have an official publisher's guild that controlled
the printing rights of authors. 6
In the late nineteenth century, as an industrial and colonial
leader, Britain's piracy problems expanded globally. The United
States freely pirated British books and sheet music and was often
the worst offender.17 Over 90% percent of sheet music that came
into Britain from the United State was pirated reprints of English
copyrighted works.' 8 To counter the problem of music piracy, in
1881, England's Music Publishers Association (MPA) was created
to monitor English copyright and established its own internal force
of investigative agents and one thousand volunteers. 9 The 1905
case of Chappel & Co v. James Fisher & Co was one of the first
cases in which the domestic infringers were given criminal
penalties.2" The MPA, through the British crown prosecuted the
defendant music company for selling 300,000 illegal copies of
sheet music. 2' One of the defendants, James Frederick Willets,
known as the "Pirate King", was leader of a group called the
People's Music Publishing Co, which had "the lofty, but illegal
goal" of providing music to the public cheaply through pirated
no
works.22 Willets was sentenced to nine months in prison with
23
hard labor and the other defendants received shorter sentences.
The United States, by contrast, from its foundation provided for
copyright protection. The United States Constitution Article I,
section 8, clause 8, expressly provided Congress with the right to
protect and encourage the creation of scientific and artistic
15. Anne E. Forkner et al., Pretty Woman Meets the Man Who Wears the
Star: FairUse After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music and American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 719, 722 (2007).
16. Martina Gillen & Gavin Sutter, Legal Protection of Copyright
Mechanisms, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 729, 748 (2004).
17. PARADISE, supra note 13, at 22.

18. Id. at 16.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. PARADISE, supra note 13, at 16.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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endeavors by granting artists and inventors exclusive rights to their
works for limited times.24 As a result, Congress was endowed
with the authority to protect the rights of copyright owners and
provide penalties for the violation of their rights. Since 1897,
criminal penalties have been a part of United States copyright law,
which designated performances and representation of copyrighted
dramatic and musical works as misdemeanors. 25 The Copyright
Act of 1909 extended the scope of misdemeanors to all works if
done "willfully" and "for profit", which created the "state of mind"
requirement that distinguishes most criminal offenses from civil
causes of action.26 The 1976 Copyright Act retained such
provisions, but also introduced the first felony penalties for
repeated culpable infringement of copyright in motion pictures and
sound recordings.27
The 1982 Piracy and Counterfeiting
Amendments Act created the first felony offenses for first time
offenders of copyright infringement of motion pictures and sound
recordings. 28 Ten years later, as a response to the rising computer
software industry, Congress passed an amendment that expanded
felony penalties to cover all kinds of copyrighted works. 29 Like all
the previous acts, however, the penalties only redressed violations

24. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Interestingly enough, one of the founding
fathers, Thomas Jefferson himself, expressed disapproval of any notions that
individuals should be given an exclusive right over their work.
[A]n idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as

long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it
forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the receiver
cannot dispossess himself of it .... Inventions then cannot,
in nature, be a subject of property.
Hughes, supra note 12, at 1029 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac

McPherson (Aug. 18, 1813), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175,
180 (H.A. Washington ed., 1857)).
25. Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481,482 (repealed 1909).
26. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 28 , 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (repealed
1976).
27. 1976 Copyright Act, 90 Stat. 2541, 2586 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §
506(a) (2006)).
28. Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982 § 3, 96 Stat. 92
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006)).
29. Act of Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4233 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §

2319).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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of the owner's reproduction and distribution rights. 3o
2. History of Trademark Counterfeiting
The history of trademark protection in common law and the
United States has traveled a different path than copyright law.
Trademarks can be traced back as far as 4000 years ago in trading
societies such as China, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, in which
manufacturers marked their goods to identify their source.31 In
England, criminal penalties for counterfeiting trademarks extends
as far back as 1206 when King John proclaimed an assize3 2 of
bread, making it illegal for bakers to adulterate their bread by
mixing beans into the dough.33 To enforce such measures,
Parliament passed a law requiring every baker to have a unique
mark for his type of bread.34
Unlike copyright law, the United States Constitution did not
provide for express protection of trademarks " Trademarks were
enforced through traditional guilds in early colonial America. In
1791, however, Samuel Breck petitioned the Second Congress for
the exclusive right to use certain marks on sailcloth.3 6 As a
response, Thomas Jefferson, who had originally opposed the IP
Clause in the Constitution, proposed the creation of a Federal
trademark statute that conferred an exclusive right to use a
trademark

and

establish

a

trademark

registration

system. 37

Congress, however, rejected the idea, and until 1870, merchants
and business owners used a system of registration to protect their
business marks.3" In 1870, Congress passed the first trademark
act, grounding the basis of protection in the IP clause of the
30. See id.
31. David D. Mouery, Comment, TrademarkLaw and the Bottom Line-Coke
Is It!, 2 BARRY L. REV. 107, 112 (2001).

32. An Assize was a decree or edict rendered by the King in one of his court
sessions. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 126 (2d ed, 2001)
33.

PARADISE,

supra note 13, at 15.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 17.
36.

ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §

1-1 section 1.01 [2]

(2007).
37. Id.
38. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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Constitution.39 Nine years later, however, in a series of the famous
Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court declared that the IP clause
could not serve as the basis for protecting trademarks and held the
1870 Act unconstitutional:
The ordinary trade-mark [sic] has no necessary
relation to invention or discovery ....

If we should

endeavor to classify it under the head of writings of
authors, the objections are equally strong ....

The

writings which are to be protected are the fruits of
intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books,
prints, engravings and the like. The trade-mark
may be, and generally is, the adoption of something
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the
party using it. At common law the exclusive right
to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.
By the act of Congress this exclusive right attaches
upon registration. But in neither case does it
depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any
work of the brain. It requires no fancy or
imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is
simply founded on priority of appropriation. 40
Thus, trademark laws were considered to fall under a different
purpose and authority than the IP clause. In 1881, Congress
responded to the Court by passing an amended the trademark act
under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 4 The 1881 Act was then
incorporated into the 1946 Trademark Act, popularly known as the
Lanham Act,42 which laid the foundation of modem trademark
law; however, it made no mention of counterfeiting and only
provided a civil suit of damages.43 The Lanham Act was
39. PARADISE, supra note 13, at 17 (citing In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S.

82 (1879)).
40. Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
41. LALONDE, supra note 36, at 1.01.

As a result, Federal trademark law

only applies to those marks circulating in interstate commerce, and States have
their own local trademark law. Id.
42. The Lanham Act was named after Representative Fritz G. Lanham of

Texas.
43. PARADISE, supra note 13, at 18.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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significant in this respect, because unlike other countries at the
time, the United States was the only industrialized country with a
substantive body of law to address the problem of product
counterfeiting.'
The late 1970s saw an explosion of counterfeited American
goods globally, and law enforcement authorities struggled to
enforce the Lanham Act despite its lack of criminal penalties. As a
result of the proliferation of commercial counterfeiting, the
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, a private coalition
created in 1982 and led by Levi Strauss & Co, lobbied for greater
protection. 5 As a result, President Ronald Reagan signed the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act in 1984,46 which criminalized
trademark counterfeiting and imposed penalties such as prison
terms, fines, treble damages, and attorney's fees.
3. Convergence ofModern Day CriminalIntellectual Property
Law
In 1996, criminal provisions in copyright and trademark law
were united through the Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection
Act.47 This law signaled a major development in criminal IP
enforcement as it expanded the Federal government's power to
enforce IP laws.48 The act designated copyright infringement,
counterfeiting, and piracy as predicate offenses under the RICO
(Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) provisions.49
This classification had several implications for law enforcement
officials because they could now (1) prosecute not just individuals
but large scale organizations and (2) instigate the seizure and
forfeiture of nonmonetary personal and real property of the

44. Id.
45. Id. at 24
46. Id.; Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit II, §1503(a) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2320).
47. 4 DRATLER JR. & MCJOHN, supra note 4, at § 13.04[1]. (citing
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110
Stat. 1386).
48. See id; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-20 (2006).
49. 4 DRATLER JR. & MCJOHN, supra note 4, at § 13.04[1]; see also 18

U.S.C. § 1961 ("[R]acketeering activity means ... any act which is indictable
under... [18 U.S.C. §2318-20].").
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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infringers."
The act also opened up the possibility of treble
damages and attorney's fees for an owner who could prove a civil
RICO violation involving copyright crimes."
At the same time, Congress continued to amend criminal
penalties for counterfeiting and piracy problems specific to
trademark and copyright law in the context of the Internet. For
example, the 1997 No Electronic Theft Act extended criminal
sanctions to Internet piracy. 2 It defined criminal copyright
infringement regardless of profit motive, which abrogated the
criminal "for profit" requirement in the 1909 Act.53 Furthermore,
it broadened the definition of the "financial gain" infringement in a
civil context, so that the statute no longer immunized individuals
for infringement for noncommercial personal or family purposes,
such as students who downloaded songs or movies for free. 4

50. 4 DRATLER JR. & MCJOHN, supra note 4, at § 13.04[1].
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) ("Any person injured in his business or property
. . . shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."). Treble damages, awarding triple the
actual damages and/or attorney's fees, is used in the context of civil damages in
intellectual property law. In trademarks, treble damages were first introduced in
the 1984 amendment to the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 17(b)(2006).
Treble damages are damages that punish the offender's willful state of mind,
deter counterfeiting, and help recoup the trademark owner's losses. See 15
U.S.C. § 1117 (2006).
52. 4 DRATLER JR. & MCJOHN, supra note 4, at § 13.04[1] (citing No
Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat 2678, 2678-2680).
53. Id. § 13.04[1] at 7 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2006)). The
authors point to 1997 House Report that suggests that " 'de minimis' copying
for private, noncommercial purposes is not criminal", but given that 'de
minimis' still holds misdemeanor liability, person who copies for private,
noncommercial purposes is still criminal in theory. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No.
105-339, at 8 (1997)). Indeed, this has occurred in reality when in January
2004, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) announced 500
"John Doe" lawsuits against unnamed college students who used "peer-to-peer"
networks to download copyrighted songs. Kim. F. Nativdad, Note, Stepping It
Up and Taking It to the Streets: Changing Civil & Criminal Copyright
Enforcement Tactics, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 469, 473 (2008). This fits into
Dratler's hypothetical of a college student who makes more than 1 copy of a
record or movie in 180 days that can have a total retail value of $1,000 for their
own personal enjoyment.
54. 4 DRATLER JR. & MCJOHN, supra note 19, § 13.04[1] at 4.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6

10

Pyun: The 2008 PRO-IP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in C

2009]

2008 PRO-IPACT

B. CriminalIntellectual PropertyProvisions

Such developments have resulted in today's criminal IP statutes,
which define criminal copyright infringement as (a) done for the
purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (b) by
reproducing more than one copyrighted record in the span of 180
days that have the total retail value of $1,000; or (c) by making
any commercially distributed item on computer, knowing that it
was intended for commercial distribution. 5
The criminal penalties for these offenses are atypical, because
they calibrate the punishment to the culpability of the infringer's
state of mind. 6 A violation under subsection (a) can result in a
maximum one year prison sentence and a fine; however, if an
offender makes more than ten copies with a total retail value of at
least $2,500, he can face a maximum five years' imprisonment. 7
For an offense committed under subsection (b), the infringer faces
the same penalties, but can face a maximum of three years in
prison for making more than ten copies with a total retail value of
$2,500.58 For an offense committed under subsection (c), the
infringer faces a maximum three years in prison and a fine. 9
Producing and trafficking counterfeited goods, also a criminal
offense, is defined as knowingly use counterfeit labels, packaging,
and goods.6 ° Section 2320 outlines the criminal penalties for
counterfeiting: one who (1) affixes counterfeit labeling and
packaging onto copyrighted goods and traffics them in interstate
commerce internationally or (2) traffics counterfeited goods and
services can face a maximum $2 million fine and a maximum
prison sentence of ten years.6 If a person is convicted of both
offenses, he can face up to $5 million in fines and a maximum
twenty year prison sentence.62 Like the copyright forfeiture
55. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2006). The IP criminal statutes are 17
U.S.C. § 506 (2006) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2320 (2006).
56. See 18 U.S.C.§ 2319(b)-(d) (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006).
57. § 2319(b)(1).
58. § 2319(c)(1).
59. § 2319(d)(1).
60. § 2318(a) (defining counterfeit labels, documentation, or packaging); §

2320(a),(e) (defining counterfeit marks in connection with goods and services).
61. § 2320(a).
62. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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provisions under 17 U.S.C. § 506, the Act also orders that all
forfeited counterfeit goods be destroyed. 63 Furthermore, the
trafficker can be ordered, in addition to these fines, to pay
restitution to the victim, and the victim can provide a "victim
impact statement" that could later be used in determining the
defendant's sentence.64
C. The Lure of Counterfeitingand Piracy in the 21st Century.
In the twenty-first century, the occurrence of counterfeiting and
piracy has exponentially increased through the Internet. A popular
number cited among industries, governmental authorities, and
legal scholars is that IP violations result in an annual loss of $250
billion to UNITED STATES industries."5 Offenses ranging from
selling fake Louis Vuitton bags to illegal copies of Harry Potter
translated into multiple languages to counterfeit HIV drugs can be
committed with one click in anonymity. Such proliferation is easy
to explain - IP offenses are particularly profitable.6 6 Piracy and
counterfeiting are especially lucrative in a society dominated by
relatively low cost consumer electronic products.67
With the expansion and awareness of such offenses, industries
and law enforcement authorities have sought to characterize IP
infringement as more than just an economic offense and have
63. § 2320(b)(2).
64. § 2320(d)(1).
Forfeiture is the divestiture of property without
compensation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004).
65. 154 CONG. REC. S7280-01, S7286 (daily ed. July 24, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Arlen Specter); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT HAS GENERALLY INCREASED, BUT
ASSESSING PERFORMANCE COULD STRENGTHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 7

(2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT 2008]; Michael M. Dubose, Criminal
Enforcement of IP Laws in the 21st Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481, 483
(2006). However, this $ 200-250 billion has not been substantiated nor been
proven by any agency or industry, and has been criticized as being
unsubstantiated and grossly exaggerated. See Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost
Jobs? The Dodgy Digits Behind the War on Piracy, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 7,
2008, http://arstechnica.com/articles/culture/
dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-piracy.ars
66. See DuBose supra note 65, at 483 ("For criminals distributing and selling
infringing or counterfeit goods, the internet is where the money is.").
67. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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sought to align it with other commonly recognized crimes. One
popular analogy used to illustrate the economics of infringement is
drug trafficking. 68 As an example, several scholars and experts
calculated that the 2007 market value of a single kilo of cocaine is
approximately $24,000 and guarantees at least 300% profit.69 In
contrast, individuals can merely use a $500 computer to create a
worldwide distribution network of pirated software and movies at
little risk of detection, which can yield profit margins up to 900%
because of the small virtual cost it takes to download and package
the pirated goods.
Industry investigators and legal authorities have also linked
pirated and counterfeited goods to large scale organized crime
groups and even terrorism.7' Counterfeited goods often fund
gangs and organized crime. In 1991, David Thai, leader of the
Vietnamese Gang, "Born to Kill", earned over $13 million from
sales of counterfeit watches in New York's Chinatown by
controlling their sale and killing competitors.72 In the 1993 World
Trade Center bombings, authorities investigated twenty alleged
counterfeiters with suspected links to the leader behind the attacks,
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, and whether the sale of counterfeited
T-shirts and sportswear were used to finance the bombings.73
1. Agency Initiative
Because of the pervasiveness and diversity of counterfeited
goods, enforcement of such criminal penalties has involved the
interest of not only the Department of Justice ("DOJ") but also
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"),
Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and the United States
68. See id. at 484; John G. Malcolm, Content Protection in a Digital Age
(Presentation Slides) in CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ABA
INAUGURAL

NATIONAL

INSTITUTE

ON

CRIMINAL

ENFORCEMENT

OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS D-8 (2007).
69. DuBose, supra note 65, at 484.
70. Id.; Malcolm, supra note 68.
71. See DuBose, supra note 65, at 484-85; see generally PARADISE supra

note 13 (especially the Chapter 4 discussion on "knockoffs" in developing
countries and correlation to organized crime).
72. PARADISE, supra note 13, at 21-22.

73. Id. at 22.
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Trade Commission ("USTC").74 Interagency coordination has
become the key focus of the Federal government's response in
combating counterfeiting and piracy.75 This Article focuses
mainly on the DOJ as a reflection of the government's policy of
criminal IP enforcement.
The DOJ's enforcement of the IP laws is mainly carried out
through the nation's ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' offices, but also
through its Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
("CCIP"). CCIP, based in Washington D.C., is comprised of
specially trained prosecutors who focus on IP crimes.76 The CCIP
section today serves mainly as an overseeing organization for
Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property ("CHIP") units of the
U.S. Attorney's Office. " As of 2004, the DOJ has thirty five of
its own CCIP attorneys who serve as the coordinating hub for
national and international efforts against IP prosecution.78
The Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) units
were created in July 2001 by the DOJ to combat high technology
crimes, such as industry hacking.79 Pioneered in San Francisco by
FBI director Robert Mueller and the U.S. Attorney's office of the
Northern District Court of California, the CHIP units main goals
are to prosecute computer crimes, including copyright and
trademark violations and to serve as legal counsel for their district
concerning IP law and cybercrime. ° Today, each U.S. Attorney's
Office has its own CHIP section where at least one government
prosecutor specially trained in IP matters who works closely with
local law enforcement to detect and monitor computer crimes. As
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

GAO REPORT 2008, supra note 65, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 20.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT

FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
INAUGURAL

NATIONAL

INSTITUTE

OF JUSTICE'S TASK

at 13 (October 2004), reprinted in ABA
ON

CRIMINAL

ENFORCEMENT

OF

(2007).
79. U.S. Dep't of Justice: CHIP (Computer Hacking and Intellectual
Property) Fact Sheet, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/chipfact.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
80. U.S. Dep't of Justice:
Attorney General Remarks Cybercrime
Announcement, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/chipagsp.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

14

Pyun: The 2008 PRO-IP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in C

2009]

2008 PRO-IP ACT

369

of 2007, there are 101 CHIP attorneys in the Attorney's office.8"
In 1999, Congress also created the National Intellectual Property
Law Enforcement Coordination Counsel ("NIPLECC") in order to
improve the coordination of law enforcement agencies.82 The
NIPLECC was an interagency committee comprised of various
federal executive department heads such as the director of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), the
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, the
Commissioner of Customs, and the Under Secretary of Commerce
for International Trade.83 The council was intended to act as the
central hub for collecting, analyzing and disseminating to the
agencies IP related complaints from the private sector, including
copyright and trademark infringement. 1 Prior to the PRO-IP Act,
however, the NIPLECC was often criticized as inefficient and
ineffective in creating a coherent interagency mandate to enforce
IP laws, and was subsequently repealed by the PRO-IP Act.85
Together, the CCIP, CHIP, and NIPLECC along with the FBI
and CBP cooperated to implement and develop the "STOP!
(Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy) Initiative in October 2004.86
The STOP initiative's goals was "to prosecute organized criminal
networks that steal creative works from U.S. businesses and
develop international interest in and commitment to the protection
of intellectual property."87
The STOP initiative resulted in
81. GAO REPORT 2008, supra note 65, at 20.
82. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act § 653, 113 Stat.
430, 480 (repealed 2008); see also GAO REPORT 2008, supra note 65, at 36-37.
83. THE NAT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION
COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON COORDINATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION 3 (2008), available

at http://www.cybercrime.gov/NIPLECCReport_2008_Final.pdf
NIPLECC REPORT].
84. Id.

[hereinafter

85. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 305(a), 122 Stat. 4256, 4270 (2008).
86. Finding and Fighting Fakes: Reviewing the Strategy Targeting
Organized Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management, the Fed. Workforce, and the Districtof Columbia of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 76, 77 (2005)
(statement of Laura Parsky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division,

Department of Justice).
87. Id.
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international large scale action against piracy and counterfeiting
networks, such as the notable Operation Fast Link and Operation
Sitedown.88 In both operations, at least twelve countries were
involved, including France, Canada, Sweden, Denmark,
Netherlands, Singapore, Australia, Germany, and Israel. 9
Operation Fastlink was the first and largest global enforcement
action taken against online piracy. ° In April 2004, the FBI and
international
law
enforcement
agencies
simultaneously
coordinated 120 searches in 27 states and 11 foreign countries
targeting "warez" piracy sites, websites that release illegal copies
of movies, software, and computer games for downloading by
disabling and removing the embedded copyright protections.9
The illegal copies had an estimated value of $50 million.92 Out of
the 175 group members who were arrested, 56 have been
prosecuted, 12 of which were felony convictions, and the latest
defendant was sentenced to eighteen months in prison.93
Approximately a year later, Operation Sitedown, an umbrella
operation for three separate undercover investigations based in
Chicago, Illinois, San Jose, California, and Charlotte, North
Carolina94 conducted eighty searches and arrested the operators of

88. Id. at 79-80.
89. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces
Eight Charged in Internet Piracy Crackdown: First Indictments Arising from
Charlotte FBI Undercover Investigation for Operation FastLink and Site Down
(July 28, 2005), availableat www.cybercrime.gov/OpSiteDown8Charge.htm.

90. Id.
91. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Operation Fastlink Defendant
Sentenced for Online Software Piracy (Sept. 7, 2006), available at
www.cybercrime.gov/abellSent.htm. "Warez" sites are underground online
communities who obtain copyrighted products before they are made available to
the general public and distribute them to the public for free downloads. Id.
92. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces
International Internet Piracy Sweep: "Operation SiteDown" Attacks Organized
Piracy Networks in 10 Countries (June 30, 2005), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/OperationSiteDown.htm.
93. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Member of Music Piracy Group
Sentenced
to
18 Months
(Sept.
19,
2008),
available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/gitartsSent.pdf.
94. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 19 Indicted in $6.5 million
"RISCISO" Software Piracy Conspiracy, at 2 (Feb. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2006/pr020l01 .pdf.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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least eight major "warez" sites, known to sell pirated software
including "Adobe Photoshop" and movies such as Mr. and Mrs.
Smith.95 Among the items seized were 118 computers, 13 laptops,
and 4,567 counterfeit CDs and DVDs.96
common
reflected the government's
Both operations
methodology in enforcing the law.
In both operations, FBI agents either had informants or created
decoy websites that attracted the warez site operators.9 7 Secondly,
coordination with foreign law enforcement was absolutely
necessary; because of the international and highly organized
distribution network among the offenders, the warez participants
could easily delete files with one keystroke once a warning had
been communicated.9" Defendants were not only from the United
States but also other countries such as the United Kingdom and
Australia. 9"
This operation has not been without controversy. On June, 22,
2007, the DOJ extradited and prosecuted Hew Raymond Griffiths,
the Australian ringleader of the oldest software piracy known as
"DrinkorDie" that made $50 million annually by selling pirated
software. It was the first extradition case in the United States for
online piracy crimes, and Griffiths, who pleaded guilty, was
sentenced to fifty-one months in prison."' 0 Thus, the successful
95. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces
International Internet Piracy Sweep: "Operation SiteDown" Attacks Organized
Piracy Networks in 10 Countries (June 30, 2005), available at

http://www.cybercrime.gov/OperationSiteDown.htm.
96. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five Additional Defendants
Charged with Violating Copyright Laws as Part of Operation Copycat (Apr. 6,
2006), availableat http://www.cybercrime.gov/soaresCharge.htm.
97. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 19 Indicted in $6.5 million
"RISCISO" Software Piracy Conspiracy, at 2 (Feb. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2006/pr0201_01 .pdf.
98. Dubose, supra note 65, at 491-92.
99. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces
Eight Charged in Internet Piracy Crackdown: First Indictments Arising from

Charlotte FBI Undercover Investigation for Operation FastLink and Site Down
(July 28, 2005), availableat www.cybercrime.gov/OpSiteDown8Charge.htm.
100. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Extradited Software Piracy
at
available
2007),
20,
(Apr.
Guilty
Pleads
Ringleader
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/04AprilPDFArchive/07/20070420griffithsnr.pdf.
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extradition of a foreign defendant, a difficult process as most
nations are not willing to extradite their own citizens, "' was
applied to an IP infringement case for the first time, demonstrating
the government's increasing willingness to treat IP violations as
serious criminal offenses.
The DOJ's willingness to undergo this sensitive process also
demonstrated how the Federal government was willing to use
heavy criminal sanctions to effectively enforce its IP laws.
Statistical data also reflects this policing. In 2007, the DOJ filed
217 IP cases -usually in criminal copyright and trademark
offenses - and sentenced 287 defendants, reflecting an "upward
trend" of a thirty-five percent increase from 2006, and a ninetytwo percent increase from 2005.102
2. Legislative Response
In the last two years, Congress and executive agencies have
continued to respectively legislate and enforce criminal IP
development. The most notable attempt was Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales's May 2007 proposal to Congress entitled the
Intellectual Property Protection Act. 01 3

The Department of

Justice's proposal of its own bill by itself demonstrated the
executive's concern in taking a more active role in IP issues. The
bill sought to (1) harmonize the forfeiture and seizure proceedings
for all areas of IP, including trademark counterfeiting and
unauthorized motion pictures and songs, (2) provide restitution for
any loss incurred by IP owners, (3) ban importation and
exportation of counterfeited goods into the United States, and (4)
impose harsher penalties for repeat offenders under the Copyright
Act."0 These sections are very similar to the forfeiture provisions
101. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL §

603
(2006),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm00603.htm
102. NIPLECC REPORT, supra note 83, at 33.
103. Letter from Richard A. Hertling, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
(May
14,
2007),
available
at
http://politechbot.com/docs/doj.intellectual.property.protection.act.2007.05 1407
.pdf [hereinafter Intellectual Property Protection Act]
104. Id. at §§ 4(a)-9(a), 13(a)
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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in the 2008 Act. Although this bill did not progress beyond a
committee referral, many of its provisions were later grafted onto
the legislative drafts of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Act
of 2008.105
This bill is also notable because it proposed more radical
changes in criminal IP enforcement; it sought to criminalize
attempts to infringe copyright and trademarks and authorize
wiretaps to investigate potential counterfeiting operations." 6 Such
provisions were controversial, because legal theories and
investigative tools traditionally reserved exclusively to the realm
of criminal law were grafted into IP enforcement issues, which
demonstrated a significant shift in the government's perspective of
07
IP law from a civil to a criminal focus. 1

III. THE 2008 PRO-IP ACT
The Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act of 2008 ("PRO-IP Act") was a culmination of all
these historical, legislative, and executive developments of
criminal IP law. While the Act's provisions may not come as a
radical change in criminal IP enforcement, it serves as a useful
focal point to analyze the shifting conception of IP offenses from
an economic to criminal paradigm. The first subsection describes
the legislative history of the PRO-IP Act and the second
subsection explains in detail the provisions of the new Act.
A. Legislative History
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced the PRO-IP Act
on July 24, 2008 to enhance the criminal penalties in all areas of IP

105. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4257, 4259, 4261-62 (to be

codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.).
106. See Intellectual Property Act, supra note 103, at §§ 4(a), 13(a).
107. Bradley J. Olson et al., The 10 Things Every PractitionerShould Know
About Anti-Counterfeiting and Anti-Piracy Protection, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 106,
143 (2007) ("It remains to be seen whether [the Act] develops any traction in
Congress in view of its sweeping changes to the status quo in the realm of
criminal and civil copyright infringement enforcement.").
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laws including counterfeiting and computer crimes.'
The bill
was a consolidated and amended version of an earlier House Bill
that had been introduced in mid-2007 by Representative John
Conyers of Michigan.109
The bill itself was relatively uncontroversial; however, a few
opposing remarks and the amendment itself demonstrate the
potential shortcomings and issues behind the notion of criminal IP
enforcement. First, the initial draft of the bill contained a
provision that would have allowed the Attorney General to file a
civil action on behalf of the aggrieved party. "' Senator Leahy,
who had previously proposed this provision in an earlier 2004
PIRACY Act,"' claimed that the purpose of such a provision was
that "a criminal sanction [was] simply too severe for the harm
done."'" 2 Yet, all of the Senators and Representatives in the
Congressional Record indicated the need to provide greater
criminal sanctions for counterfeiting and piracy."'3 The Senator's
marks were interesting when considering Congress's overall
unanimity on the pressing need to enhance criminal sanctions to
deter the ever increasing pervasiveness and harm of IP
infringement." 4 The opposition to the bill was sparse, but it
provided some insight into the issues of using criminal sanctions to
counter the counterfeiting and piracy problem. In the House,
Representatives Chris Cannon of Utah and Zoe Lofgren of
108. 154 CONG. REC. S7280-01, S7280 (daily ed. July 24, 2008) (statement
of Sen. Leahy).
109. See generally H.R. REP. No. 110-617 (2007).
110. S. 3325, 110th Cong. § 101 (2008) ("In lieu of a criminal action under
section 506, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in the
appropriate United States district court against any person who engages in
conduct constituting an offense under section 506.").
111. See S. 2377, 108th Cong. (2006).
112. 154 CONG. REC. S7280-01, S7281 (daily ed. July 24, 2008) (statement
of Sen. Leahy).
113. 154 CONG. REc. H10229-02, H10236 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008)
(statements of Rep. Coble and Rep. Berman).
114. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4279 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.) ("It is the Sense of Congress
that

. . .

effective criminal enforcement of the intellectual property laws against

violations in all categories of works should be among the highest priorities of
the Attorney General.").
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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California expressed concerns about the possibility of an
overreaching application of the forfeiture provisions as an
"extraordinary assertion of Federal authority" over the personal
lives of citizens and their personal belongings, because it would
allow for the potential seizure of personal property like a family
computer in which a student may have downloaded copyrighted
songs. 115
Despite such objections, the bill was amended once and easily
passed on September 26, 2008 in both houses and was signed into
law October 13, 2008.116
B. Provisions of the Act
The PRO-IP Act comprises five titles. Title I enhances penalties
for civil IP, Title II enhances penalties for criminal IP laws, Title
III creates a new interagency advisory committee that repeals the
NIPLECC and establishes a joint strategic plan against
counterfeiting and piracy, Title IV establishes a Federal grant
program to local law enforcement agencies to combat IP crimes,
and Title V mandates reports by the United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) on ensuring the IP rights of
American manufacturers and auditing the interagency committee
to prevent the inefficient overlap of resources in enforcing IP laws.
In discussing the specific criminal sanctions and their implications,
this Article focuses mainly on the first two Titles of the Act.
Title I provides for the enhancements of civil IP laws. First, it
amends the civil infringement provisions found in 17 U.S.C. §
411, which required the registration of the copyright as a
prerequisite for instituting a civil action." 7 The new amendment
relaxes the registration requirement by allowing a "certificate of
registration ... regardless of whether [it] contains any inaccurate
information" to satisfy the registration prerequisite for
commencing a civil action." 8 The Act also amends 17 U.S.C. §
115. 154 CONG. REc. H10229-02, H10237 (statements of Rep. Cannon and
Rep. Lofgren).
116. The final vote tally was 381-41. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 664,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/roll664.xml (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
117. 17U.S.C. §411(a)(2006).
118. 122 Stat. at 4257.
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411 to expressly pertain only to civil infringement actions,
therefore obviating the registration requirement for criminal
actions." 9 Second, the Act extends the scope of 17 U.S.C. § 503,
which provided impoundment of the infringing goods by
authorizing not only the seizure of the infringing copies and
"articles by means of which such copies may be reproduced", but
also the seizure of all records "documenting the manufacture, sale,
or receipt of things involved" in the infringement. 12 Third, the
Act amends the Lanham Act provision for statutory and actual
damages: (1) treble damages for trademark counterfeiting are
extended to individuals who provide the goods and services
necessary for an infringer to sell goods with counterfeited
" ' and (2) the minimum and maximum statutory
trademarks 12
damages are doubled. 122 Finally, the Act amends 17 U.S.C. § 602,
by extending the definition of the infringement of "copies or
phonorecords" to cover exportation in addition to importation, as
23
provided in the previous Act. 1
Title II of the Act enhances criminal penalties for
infringement of all areas of IP. First, the Act expressly designates
criminal copyright infringement "a felony," replacing the more
ambiguous term of "offense," effectively eliminating IP
misdemeanors.'2 4
Furthermore, the Act creates additional
penalties for bodily harm and death resulting in criminal
trafficking of counterfeited goods; an offender who "knowingly or
recklessly causes or attempts to cause serious bodily harm" from
intentionally trafficking counterfeited goods could receive a
maximum of twenty years' imprisonment in addition to any
fines. 125 An offender who "knowingly or recklessly causes or
attempts to cause death" from intentionally trafficking

119.
120.
121.
122.

See § 411 (originally only registration and infringement actions).
122 Stat. at 4258 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (2006)).
§ 103, 122 Stat. at 4259 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006)).
§ 104, 122 Stat. at 4259. The statutory minimum is doubled from $500

to $1000, the maximum is doubled from $100,000 to $200,000, and for willful
counterfeiting cases, the statutory maximum is doubled from $1 million to $2

million. Id.
123. § 105, 122 Stat. at 4259-60.
124. § 208, 122 Stat. at 4263 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006)).
125. § 205, 122 Stat. at 4261 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2006)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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counterfeited goods could be imprisoned for life or fined. 126
Secondly, Title II repeals 17 U.S.C. § 509, which originally
outlined the forfeiture and impoundment procedures for copyright
infringement. A new section provides more detailed provisions on
civil and criminal forfeiture. 127 In both cases, the forfeiture
extends to not only the counterfeiting items and all property used
to commit the offenses, but also any property "constituting or
derived from any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a
result of the commission of" any criminal or civil counterfeiting
offense. 12 However, unlike civil forfeiture, criminal forfeiture
involves the seizure of property only after an individual's
conviction and presumes mandatory destruction of the forfeited
property at the end of the forfeiture proceeding. 129
Furthermore, the new section mandates that the convicted
offender must also pay restitution to "any victim of the offense as
an offense against property."' 3 ° The Act also mandates restitution
across the board for all IP crimes including unauthorized
recordings of motion pictures and trade secrets under the
Economic Espionage Act.13'
Title III outlines the Federal efforts against counterfeiting and
infringement by creating an Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator ("IPEC"), appointed by the president, to oversee an
interagency IP enforcement advisory committee. 3 2 Title III
expressly repeals the NIPLECC."' The new IPEC advisory
committee includes the heads of the departments and agencies
involved in the original NIPLECC.'

The agency's goal is to

create a joint strategic plan that identifies the problems in domestic
and international counterfeiting and creates solutions to enforce

126. Id.
127. § 206, 122 Stat. at 4262-63 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2323).
128. Id.at 4262.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. §§ 201,207, 122 Stat. at 4261-62.
132. § 301, 122 Stat. at 4265.
133. § 305(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 4270 ("[The NIPLECC] isrepealed effective
upon confirmation of the IPEC by the Senate and publication of such

appointment inthe Congressional Record.").
134. § 301(b)(3), 122 Stat. at 4266.
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the United States' IP rights.135 The IPEC is responsible for
submitting to Congress an annual progress report on the findings
of the joint strategic plan.'3 6 This report is to include, among other
things, performance measures to monitor results of enforcement
and to develop "metrics" to measure "the effectiveness of the
Federal Government's efforts to improve the laws and
enforcement
practices
of foreign
governments
against
3
7
counterfeiting and infringement."'
Title IV provides more specific changes within the Department
of Justice. It provides $25 million between the fiscal years of 2009
and 2013 for the DOJ to make grants called "IP-TIC grants"
(Intellectual Property Theft and Infringement Crimes) to eligible
state and local entities to assist them in investigating IP crimes, to
provide specialized training, and to promote the sharing of
information and analyses between federal and state agencies
concerning investigations and prosecutions of criminal copyright
infringement.' 3 8 Title IV also seeks to improve investigative and
forensic resources to enforce criminal IP laws by adding more
specialized personnel in the CHIP and CCIP units of the DOJ and
U.S. Attorney's Office. 139 Within the DOJ, at least ten more
specialized FBI agents would be added to the CCIP, and at least
one specialized FBI agent and at least two specialized Assistant
United States Attorneys would be added in the CHIP units of the
U.S. Attorney's office. 4' 0 Title IV further requires that the FBI and
Attorney General submit an annual report including the number of
investigations, arrests, prosecutions, and any imposed penalties in
order to provide annual evaluations on the government's progress
in enforcing IP laws."'
Title V, the final title, mandates that the GAO conduct a study to
"help determine how the Federal Government could better protect
the intellectual property of manufacturers" by gathering data on
135. § 301(b)(1), 122 Stat. at 4266.

136. § 304, 122 Stat. at 4266-67.
137. §§ 303(e)-(f), 304, 122 Stat. 4268-70. This is closely tied to general
policy of numerical goals, which has been criticized by the Department of

Justice. See GAO REPORT 2008, supra note 65 at app. V at 6.
138. § 401(b)(1), 122 Stat. at4271.
139. § 402(a), 122 Stat. at 4272.

140. Id.
141. § 404, 122 Stat. at 4274.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6

24

Pyun: The 2008 PRO-IP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in C

2008 PRO-IPACT

2009]

the impacts of imported and domestic counterfeited goods on the
manufacturing industry and overall economy of the United
States. 14 2 Because the Federal government seeks an interagency
approach to enforce IP laws, the GAO would also be responsible
for ensuring minimal overlap of materials, facilities, and resources
between the respective federal agencies." 3
IV. ANALYSIS
The criminalization of IP offenses represents a difficult
intersection of views on property rights, harm, and societal
condemnation, and it is important to examine such assumptions in
order to understand the implications of the PRO-IP Act. The
PRO-IP Act demonstrates Congressional use of the property
paradigm to morally justify criminalizing IP offenses as reflected
in the Act's emphasis of forfeiture and restitution, remedies often
designated for traditional property offenses. However, the
application of traditional property sanctions to criminal IP law
blurs the boundaries between civil and criminal IP proceedings,
resulting in uneasy implications for the DOJ's prosecutorial
independence and authority to implement a balanced IP policy
between the IP owner and the general public.
A. The Property Paradigmand the PRO-IPAct
The PRO-IP Act's enhancement of criminal sanctions
demonstrates Congress' underlying assumption that IP and the
rights created under it are like those under traditional property law.
Congress' "propertization" of IP rights is nothing new; ever since
the conception of providing criminal sanctions to IP violations,
Congress has used the language of "theft" in trademark and
copyright and describe infringers as "pirates."' "Theft" seems to
be a rhetorical tool for Congress that allows it to evoke the norms
142. § 501, 122 Stat. at 4277.
143. § 502, 122 Stat. at 4278-79.
144. 154 CONG. REC. S7280-01, S7280 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2008) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) ("This valuable property is also terribly vulnerable; by its very

nature it is subject to numerous types of thievery and misappropriation. The
Internet... is... an unparalleled tool for piracy.").
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of social and moral condemnation seen in criminal property
offenses.
Throughout the PRO-IP Act, the language of theft pervades
Congress's justifications for passing the bill.'45 Supporters of the
PRO-IP Act decried copyright and trademark counterfeiting as
causing the loss of thousands of jobs and millions of dollars in
revenue.'46 By using the language of theft and loss, Congress
implicitly assumed that (1) IP owners have the right to capture all
external benefits that derive from their IP, and (2) that any
potential loss of this benefit is analogous to depriving the IP owner
use of his "property."
Several differences between traditional and IP exposes the
weaknesses of the assumption that IP functions like property.
First, the rationale for property law is based on the fundamental
difference between IP and real property. The purpose of granting
property rights to property owners is to allow them to capture the
full benefits derived from the use of that property. "'

For example,

the owner of a house should be allowed to use it and live in it the
way he pleases (excepting those uses that would harm society)
without the public impinging on his enjoyment. But this right to
exclude the public in order to sustain the owner's incentive to
invest in developing efficient uses of his property and thus
increase social welfare does not apply as neatly onto copyright and
trademark counterfeiting offenses. 48
'
Unlike traditional property, IP in the form of information and

145. See 154 CONG. REC. E2141-01, E2141 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008)

(statement of Rep. Blackburn) ("[T]hese industries are suffering from rampant
theft of their intellectual property online."); 154 CONG. REC. S9583-02, S9589

(daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Intellectual property is the
lifeblood of our economy, and protecting that property from theft . . . is
important.").
146. E.g., 154 CONG. REC. S7280-01, S7286 (daily ed. July 24, 2008)

(statement of Sen. Specter) ("[R]oughly 78 percent of world trade every year is
in counterfeit goods. That is the equivalent of as much as $512 billion in global
lost sales. Of that amount, U.S. companies annually lose between $200 billion

and $250 billion in sales .... According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
overall intellectual property theft costs 750,000 U.S. jobs a year.").
147. See Mark A. Lemley, Property,Intellectual Property,and Free Riding,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (2005).
148. Id. at 1051.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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ideas cannot be "depleted"; more than one person can use the
product without degrading its use.149 Thomas Jefferson, who
believed that no individual should have IP rights, wrote:
[an idea's] peculiar character, too, is that no one
possesses the less, because every other possesses
the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me,
receives instruction himself without lessening mine;
as he who lights his taper at mines, receives light
without darkening me ....

Inventions then cannot,

in nature, be subject to property. 5 '
In a more contemporary critique against using the property
paradigm in the context of IP law enforcement, Judge Posner
reiterated this point as he argues that IP is distinguishable from
real property in the critical aspect that its "public good aspect" can
be shared without reducing its value.' 5
The second problem of using the property paradigm in IP law is
that the language of "loss" cannot be applied analogously between
real property and IP, especially in the context of counterfeiting.
Lost potential sales and its harm to the economy are justifications
for criminalizing IP counterfeiting. But while one can analogize a
lost sale to shoplifting, the harm to the copyright owner is much
less certain because the owner still retains the ability to sell the
information.' 2 Thus, lost sales reaffirm the Jeffersonian argument
that ideals cannot truly be "owned" in the sense that traditional
149. Posner, supra note 2, at 178.
150. Hughes, supra note 12, at 1030.
151. Posner, supra note 2, at 178.
152. Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An
Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731,
756-57 (2003). Professor Moohr argued that while one instance of shoplifting

causes relatively small harm to a proprietor, and the penalty is therefore
proportionately small, the goal of the law is to prevent the damage caused by the
aggregation of shoplifters. This is similar to counterfeiting of intellectual

property in that one counterfeiter does not create significant economic harm,
whereas many counterfeiters of the same property can wreak havoc. The
significant distinction between the two is that real property has a finite
inventory, while the holder of intellectual property retains the ability to use the
property counterfeited. Id.
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property can be physically contained and excluded from the
public. Furthermore, diverted losses evoke thorny policy decisions
with socioeconomic considerations. To "calculate" the harm to the
IP owner through the diverted sales, prosecutors must encounter
such problems. For example, among consumers who purchase or
sell counterfeit Louis Vuitton bags are those who would not be
able to purchase the real product. ' How does one distinguish
between those who are able to afford the IP owner's goods and
those who could never have access to those goods because of their
economic position?
B. ForfeitureandRestitution: Property remediesfor a Property
Offense
The PRO-IP Act's emphasis of forfeiture and restitution as
criminal tools demonstrate the use of the property paradigm in
criminal IP offenses.
In addition to expressly mandating
restitution for all IP criminal offenses, the PRO-IP Act creates a
new, simplified IP forfeiture provision that is brought to the
forefront of IP criminal enforcement.' 54 The new forfeiture section
provides civil and criminal forfeiture provisions that both allow for
the "seizure of properties obtained directly or indirectly as a result
of an offense."' 55 However, the blurring of civil and criminal
processes in IP law creates problematic implications for the DOJ's
prosecutorial boundaries.
Forfeiture is essentially a property remedy.
Historically,
forfeiture was recognized under English common law, in which
property that was the indirect or direct cause of death was forfeited
by the Crown and "distributed for pious uses."' 56 In colonial
America, property was seized in connection to felonies or treason
153. See Posner, supra note 2, at 179 ("[O]wners of intellectual property
have... appropriate[ed] the term "piracy".

.

. to describe unauthorized copying,

even though there is a huge difference between copying one's intellectual
property and taking someone's physical property.").
154. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 206, 122 Stat. 4256, 4262-63 (to be codified at 18

U.S.C. § 2323).
155. Id. at 4263.
156. Douglas Kim, Note, Asset Forfeiture, Giving up Your Constitutional
Rights, 19 CAMPBELL L. REv. 527, 531 (1997).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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a concept expressly recognized and limited by the
Constitution.'57
Thereafter, civil forfeiture proliferated, but
criminal forfeiture was not recognized as a crime fighting strategy
until 1970, when Congress enacted the forfeiture provisions in the
RICO statutes with the aim to deprive criminal organizations of
their illegally acquired property and goods.'58 In 1996, the RICO
statute's forfeiture provisions were expanded to include products
of IP violations. 5 9
Today, forfeiture plays important functions in the enforcement
of IP offenses: (1) it removes items from stream of commerce; (2)
it forfeits the tools and equipment used to commit further IP crime;
(3) it prevents reinvestment into criminal enterprise; and (4) it
serves as a powerful deterrent by reinforcing the message that

-

crime does not pay. 160

In general, the criminal forfeiture

proceedings begin after the offender has been convicted. Criminal
forfeitures for copyright and trademark counterfeiting offenses,
therefore, seem to fit into the forfeiture's rationale of punishing the
guilty individual and deterring others, because part of the punitive
deterrence requires that "the fruits of the crime" be destroyed.
A potential problem with the PRO-IP's forfeiture provisions,
however, is that the Act expands the scope of allowable seizures to
"any property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained
directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of an
offense."' 16 ' Determining what constitutes the "proceeds" from IP
crimes could be anomalous and unprecedented in scope, because
extending the scope of the forfeiture provisions implicates the
possible property interests of innocent individuals. For example, a
video store owner who sells counterfeit DVD movies could not
157. Id. at 532 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2).
158. Arthur W. Leach and John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An
AppropriateSolution to the Civil ForfeitureDebate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 241,
250 (1994).
159. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)).
160. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CRIMES
MANUAL
288
(3d
ed.
2006)
available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipmanual/ipma2006.pdf [hereinafter
DOJ IP MANUAL]; see also Leach, supra note 158, at 266.

161. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 206, 122 Stat. 4256, 4262.
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only have his personal computer seized as well as any income
derived from his business, but also the family computer he
purchased as a result. One concerned citizens group called Public
Knowledge testified in the Act's 2007 Congressional hearings that
"the expansion of forfeiture provisions also risks disproportionate
penalties . . . . [T]he bill casts too broad a net, offering up for
forfeiture materials ... that may have only a fleeting connection to

the offense."1 6 2 Unlike typical criminal searches and seizures, the
fruits of crime may not be immediately apparent. Thus, when
executing a search warrant or forfeiture application, enforcement
officials would have to either engage in discretionary seizures or
would have to search deeper than the initial warrant requires. This
unwarranted expansion endangers both parties-the prosecution
faces violating the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the defendant's
expectation of privacy is injured.
The PRO-IP's new emphasis of restitution also emphasizes the
PRO-IP's property paradigm.
The PRO-IP Act mandates
restitution for all types of criminal IP offenses once an individual
has been convicted. ,63 Restitution requires that an offender
compensate the victim for the loss and "restore ... [him or her to
the] prior state of well being."1
Federal law requires that the

defendant pay restitution in offenses involving the loss or
destruction of property including any offense committed by fraud
or deceit. 165

However, restitution has always been a thorny and controversial
issue in criminal IP law due to the difficulty in calculating the IP
owner's loss. In IP counterfeiting offenses, determining restitution
is particularly difficult and susceptible to fail. The victims first
have to be identified and distinguished between those who were
defrauded and those who knew the items were counterfeit.' 66 A

162. PrioritizingResources and Organizationfor IntellectualPropertyAct of
2007: Hearing on HR. 4279 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 72 (2007)

(statement of Gigi Sohn, President, Public Knowledge).
163. 122 Stat. at 4260-64 (amending scattered sections in 18 U.S.C.)
164. DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 275.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(1) (2006).
166. DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 281.
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further distinction has to be made between those were harmed by
conduct that was the basis of the offense and those who were
harmed by conduct that was not part of the offense. 67 Second, the
loss has to be calculated by the victim's loss and not the
defendant's gain. 68 Courts have used the offender's inventory, the
total retail value of the infringing material, or the amount of
statutory damages that the victim could have obtained from the
defendant in a civil case.'69 However, these calculations actually
look to the victim's loss in context of the defendant's earnings, and
presume that the hypothetical loss of the copyright or trademark
holder is equivalent to the defendant's earnings.
Hence, emphasizing forfeiture and restitution reinforces
Congress's characterization of IP crimes as property offenses. If
criminal IP punishment is any indication of the social harm that
Congress seeks to prevent, the message here is that counterfeiting
is condemned because it diverts sales from the IP holder, which in
turn, violates the holder's "property" rights to exclude the public
and maximize external benefits that derive from their use.
C. ProsecutorialAuthority within Blurred Boundaries
The PRO-IP Act's emphasis of forfeiture and restitution to
enforce criminal IP laws creates problematic implications for the
federal government's future role in IP law, especially the DOJ,
which has the role of implementing legislative policy, thus
reflecting societal norms. First, prosecutorial boundaries are
undermined as forfeiture provisions give incentive for DOJ
prosecutors to become more involved in private civil proceedings.
Second, the DOJ's prosecutorial independence is undermined as
the PRO-IP Act upsets the fundamental balance sought in IP law,
the protection of IP owners and the general public's access to the

167. Id. (citing to Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990)). For

example, if the element of an offense is only the possession of a stolen credit
card, then victims who were harmed by the use of that credit card may not be
entitled to restitution for that offense. Id.
168. Id. at 284.
169. Id. at 285-86. (citing United States v. Martin, 64 F. App'x 129 (10th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Chay 281 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Manzer, 69 F.3d 222 (8th Cir. 1995)).
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owner's IP.
The streamlined PRO-IP forfeiture provision provides the DOJ
with the opportunity to use civil forfeiture proceedings in targeting
criminal investigations of counterfeiting offenses.
In IP cases, the line between criminal and civil liability is thin.
Criminal copyright infringement is not an independent offense;
civil copyright infringement is a prerequisite for criminal
liability. 70 In fact, the mere distinguishing factor between the
criminal and civil IP offenses is that in a criminal case, the
offender possesses a criminally culpable state of mind whereas
civil liability is a strict liability offense. 7'
For the DOJ, civil forfeiture proceedings could provide a more
efficient and effective tool in achieving its aims. There are several
reasons why civil forfeiture is an attractive option for the DOJ.
First, civil forfeiture proceedings are an in rem action, an action
against the property itself; therefore, property may be seized
regardless of ownership. In contrast, criminal forfeiture actions
are in personam -

against the offender -

so the offender must be

present in the action and the government cannot seize a third
party's property. Second, civil forfeiture proceedings have a much
lower burden of proof. In civil forfeiture proceedings, the IP
holder only needs to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the
crime was committed and that property derived from such crime.'72
On the other hand, criminal forfeiture proceedings only commence
once the defendant has been found guilty; therefore, the
government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime. 73
'

The use of forfeiture proceedings blurs prosecutorial boundaries
as civil forfeiture proceedings could easily be abused in assisting
criminal prosecution. IP owners, especially those who have the
resources to investigate, could first initiate a civil in rem action
against the offending property itself.

'

A civil in rem action

merely requires that the moving party present themselves to the
170. 4 DRATLER JR. & MCJOHN, supra note 4, at § 13.04, 5; see also 17
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006).
171. 4 DRATLER JR. & McJOHN, supra note 4, at § 13.04, 5.
172. DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 295.
173. Id.
174. Id. at290.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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court even in the absence of the other party to request a seizure of
property through means of a preliminary injunction or a temporary
restraining order.'75 The threshold to establish the seizure of goods
is relatively low,' 76 and an IP owner who seeks further punishment
(or damages) has nothing to lose by referring the case to the DOJ.
The DOJ could then preserve such forfeited property that would be
relevant for an ongoing or future criminal case.' 77 The need for
traditional criminal investigatory tools, such as pre-indictment
seizure warrants, could be obviated as the impoundment of
infringing items in civil forfeiture proceedings and may eliminate
the need for the government to establish the higher burden of
probable cause.
Finally, the DOJ, on behalf of the government, could initiate
civil forfeiture proceedings itself as part of the criminal
investigation, which implicates the balance of the private-public
access paradigm in IP. This means that an Assistant U.S. Attorney
("AUSA") has several opportunities to use civil forfeiture
proceeding as a criminal tool. In the absence of an indictment,
however, such involvement would be inappropriate, because an
AUSA should maintain prosecutorial independence and avoid
being seen as advancing special interests.
The legislative history of the PRO-IP act demonstrates that
Congress recognized the danger of such blurred boundaries. In the
initial draft of the PRO-IP Act, Senator Leahy, who was a career
state prosecutor, intended the PRO-IP Act to include a provision
that would have allowed the Attorney General to initiate civil IP
actions against offenders at his discretion.'78 This provision was
stricken without legislative comment, but the result demonstrates
the controversial implications of the government representing
private interests. Interestingly enough, Congress has failed to
realize that the seemingly innocuous forfeiture provision could
effectively achieve the same controversial end: it creates an
175. Paul S. Owens, Impoundment Proceduresunder the CopyrightAct: The
ConstitutionalInfirmities, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211, 252 (1985).
176. Id.
177. See DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 294.
178. S. 3325, 110th Cong. § 101 ("[T]he Attorney General may commence a

civil action in the appropriate United States district court against any person
who engages in conduct constituting an offense under section 506.").
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opportunity for the DOJ to utilize the civil forfeiture proceedings
in the unique context of IP blindly favors Congress's policy
objectives: to protect and strengthen American industry's IP rights
at the expense of the general public's own IP rights.
D. ProsecutorialIndependence amidst UnbalancedBoundaries
The blurring of civil and criminal penalties also affects
prosecutorial independence, which is an important theme of the
PRO-IP Act. While the DOJ is a representative of government that
must follow federal policy, its independence allows it to limit or
restrict Congressional policy underlying the law. The ultimate
purpose of IP law is to preserve the balance between public access
and IP owner rights, and the PRO-IP Act demonstrates Congress's
pro-IP industry policies. Given the increasing prominence of
Congress's support of IP owner rights, the DOJ now has an
important role in influencing and shaping this balance.
In light of Congress's strong interest in protecting IP industries,
prosecutorial independence is particularly important in sustaining a
balanced governmental IP policy by limiting improper influence.
U.S. Attorneys must tread a very fine line as the representative of
the government's policies and as an advocate for public norms.
Even though the DOJ must follow federal policy, as an advocate of
societal norms, it has the responsibility to advocate the public's
interest as a whole without the influence of lobbyists or other
special interest groups that often advance political agendas in
Congress. Political theory may be helpful in understanding the
tensions inherent in the DOJ's relationship with Congress. Federal
criminal statutes are often deliberately vague and overly broad,
because Congress delegates power to the more specialized
agencies and endows the government prosecutors with broad
discretion to interpret the law and choose which policies to pursue
in advancing such an interpretation.179 Congress does so, because
the public does not trust any "political tampering" in the criminal
179. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, CongressionalDelegation,
and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 762 (1999). "Freed from

the need to internalize the costs of broad enactments ... legislators can pursue
such statutes without even considering their enforcement consequences." Id. at
772.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/6
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For example,
process and with prosecutorial independence.
Senators who try to intervene in a trial are seen as pursuing special
interests or provide unwarranted exceptions to the law.' s° As a
result, Congress has developed "remarkable sophistication in
designing administrative structures and processes to ensure that
agencies 'produce policy outcomes that legislators deem
satisfactory."" 8 ' Budget controls, reporting requirements, and the
oversight process are some legislative "control" mechanisms
which enhance the likelihood of favoring powerful special interest
groups who want to restrain enforcement in certain sensitive

areas. 182
The PRO-IP Act demonstrates these tensions between
Congressional favor of specialized private interests and the
sustainability of prosecutorial independence. Under Title III and
IV of the PRO-IP Act, the new interagency committee IPEC would
be headed by the presidentially-appointed overseer. The Act
outlines comprehensive reporting guidelines for not only IPEC but
also the DOJ and FBI as part of the allocation of additional
resources 183 and requires detailed annual reports including
84
statistical assessments as a key part of effective enforcement.'
Legislators who initially opposed the first draft of the PRO-IP bill
were concerned that the IPEC might result in political interference
with the DOJ's decisions and "improper contacts between the
White House and the [DOJ] on prosecutions and investigations."'85
On the other hand, other congressional members, such as Senator
Tom Coburn of Oklahoma opposed the bill on the basis that the

180. Id. at 762.
181. Id. at 789 (quoting Matthew D. McDubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics, and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 432 (1989)).

182. Id. at 791-93.
183. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, §§ 303-04, 122 Stat. 4256, 4265. IPEC's annual

report must include "performance measures to ...monitor results," and the DOJ
must also submit a detailed annual report of how funds were specifically
allocated and the number of arrests. Id. at 4268, 4274-75.
184. Id. at 4268-70.
185. 154 CONG. REc. S9583-02, S9590 (daily ed. Sept. 15. 2008) (statement

of Sen. Kyl).
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IPEC did not create enough agency oversight.' 6
In past similar attempts, the DOJ has rebuffed Congressional
attempts to control the agency. In response to the March 2008
GAO Report, which recommended that the DOJ create numerical
goals to facilitate IP enforcement efforts,8 7 the DOJ wrote: "the
[DOJ] has intentionally resisted setting ...percentage 'targets' as
performance measures because it creates the risk that prosecutions
could be initiated . . for the improper purpose of meeting
prosecution quotas or the expectations of . . . Congressional
officials."'SSuch disagreements demonstrate that the DOJ is not
merely a rubber stamp of Congressional policies in IP law, and
that the PRO-IP Act ultimately maintains the Congress-agency
dichotomy, when it was amended to expressly limit the authority
of IPEC so that it does not control or influence the DOJ's
prosecutorial decisions.' 89
However, the PRO-IP Act fails to address the unresolved
problems in criminal IP law that hinder the DOJ from effectively
taking a role in shaping IP policy. The biggest challenge that the
DOJ faces today is to effectively deter IP offenses. In doing so, it
must reconcile government policy with society's resistance to
internalize IP offenses as part of its conception of criminally
condemnable harm. Scholars who argue that IP offenses cannot be
justified under traditional criminal theories reason that the
pervasiveness of IP offenses is due to a lack of society's moral
condemnation of such behavior. 9 ° The fundamental problem is
that the criminalization of IP is justified by the problem of scale.
The downloading of a song by one student itself is not a
condemnable social harm, but rather the fact that numerous people
are downloading thousands of songs: "just as we call a billion sand
186. 154 CONG. REC. S9469-01, S9469 (daily ed. Sept. 25. 2008) (statement
of Sen. Coburn) ( "We are going to put $300 million plus into this program but
we are not going to force the Justice Department to tell us what they are doing
with it. Until ...there are some teeth to make the Justice Department do what
we tell them to do ...I am going to have to regretfully [reject the bill].").
187. GAO REPORT 2008, supra note 65, at 32, 35 ("Without performance
measures related to these statistics, it is not clear how these statistics should be
assessed because it is not clear what the agencies sought to achieve.").
188. Id. at 75 app. V.
189. 122 Stat. at 4270.
190. See Moohr, supra note 152, at 754-57.
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particles a 'pile,' but not a single grain, many of us intuitively feel
that the individual acts cannot be called 'piracy,' but the larger
Society is still not convinced that the act
phenomenon can be."''
song
on the internet amounts to harm that
a
copyrighted
of posting
society condemns, which consequently undermines Congress's
efforts to convince the public that IP offenses are morally
condemnable. While criminal law often reflects and maintains the
societal attitudes on the immorality of harm, "criminal law
standing alone is unlikely to engender internalization of the values
the law represents."' 92 In other words, it is difficult to impose
upon society the view that IP offenses are immoral unless society
thinks that the offense is harmful to begin with.
The PRO-IP Act does little to bridge this gap between legislative
and public perception; Congress justifies criminalizing IP offenses
based on the harm it causes to American industries but is silent as
to this potential problem of sanctioning such offenses. Congress's
propertization of IP aligns itself expressly with special interests of
IP owners. It is concerned with protecting American industries' IP
and wants to ensure that law enforcement agencies effectively
implement Congressional policy. The public also perceives the
federal government as favoring the IP owner rather than societal
Given the exposure and publicity of
interests in IP access.'
industry campaigns against infringers, IP offenses have become
cast in a way that aligns Congress in the favor of big industry.' 94
The PRO-IP Act also fails to address the DOJ's agency specific
problems that further hinder its potential to shape an effective and
One problem is the low
sustainable criminal IP policy.
prioritization of prosecuting IP crimes. Criminal IP offenses
remain low on the DOJ and FBI's priorities-among the FBI's six
If an
cybercrime priorities, IP enforcement ranked fifth. "'
individual is charged with several crimes, prosecutors are willing

191. Hughes, supra note 12, at 1072.
192. Moohr, supra note 152, at 776.
193. See DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 340 ("The government might

be portrayed as a pawn of wealthy corporate interests.").
194. Id. at 316 ("IP right holders are often interested in securing economic..
relief, but, unlike many other victims, [they] . . .have the resources to
aggressively pursue that relief themselves.").
195. GAO REPORT 2008, supra note 65, at 13.
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to drop any IP charges in favor of more punitive sentences under
other offenses.' 96 This in turn leads to lower visibility and
prosecution of IP crimes. Thus, low prioritization is a problem
because it signals low allocation of time and resources to analyze
and develop criminal IP law. And without a stronger articulated
strategy and experience of its own, the DOJ is more susceptible to
follow Congress's generalized policy without realizing its
implications. This has already been seen through the failures of the
NIPLECC, which was ineffective due to the lack of the agencies'
prioritization and lack of agency-defined goals.'97 The result was a
complete lack of meaningful dialogue and education of the public
regarding the condemnable harm of IP crimes.
Another problem is that the executive members in DOJ have
reflected their own support of the property paradigm, which has
undermined the potential for a more balanced IP policy. AUSAs
are instructed under the DOJ's IP manual that IP "is property as
much as any tangible property" and that counterfeiting offenses
"defraud unwitting customers into paying for [counterfeit]
products."' 98 Under the Bush administration, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzalez proposed a 2007 IP Act directly to Congress that
would have authorized wiretaps on potential counterfeiting
offenses and criminalize attempts to counterfeit. 9 9
The
impositions of such drastic criminal mechanisms onto IP laws only
widen the gap between public and governmental perception of IP
crime.
Furthermore, a secret Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement between the United States law enforcement agencies
and other countries alarmed groups who have advocated for
greater public IP access. 20 '

The controversy is not based on the

contents of the document, but the fact that the contents of the
document are unknown. 20 '
Such secrecy is particularly
disconcerting in an area where the public domain and access
196. Id. at 23 n.38.
197. Id. at 37 n.66 ("NIPLECC struggled to define its purpose.... This was
due in part to a lack of clear expectations in its authorizing legislation.").

198. DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 276.
199. Intellectual Property Protection Act, supra note 103, at 2, 7.
200. Nate Anderson, Secret ACTA Treaty Emerges blinking into the Sunlight,
ARs TECHNICA, Sept. 24, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080924secret-acta-treaty-emerges-blinking-into-the-sunlight.html.

201. Id.
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remains a crucial consideration in formulating IP laws and hurts
public confidence in the government to shape a more balanced
policy.
Public access to IP remains a crucial policy consideration even
in the context of counterfeiting; creativity and innovation may
necessarily require duplication of copyrighted or trademarked
works. From Congress's perspective, the targets of the PRO-IP Act
are the counterfeited goods traffickers and illegal warez website
rings. To condemn IP counterfeiting automatically as felonies
ignores the effects it has on to the public at large, because to
criminally condemn all copying of copyrighted and trademark
works for profit implicates the larger cultural paradigm that falls
beyond Congress's intended purview. For example, Professor
Lawrence Lessig writes that the proliferation of the "Youtube"
phenomenon, in which individuals duplicate ("pirate") copyrighted
and trademarked works as part of their own creative expression on
the internet, demonstrates the failure of criminal IP laws to blend
into the greater cultural consciousness: "it is time we recognize
that we can't kill this creativity. We can only criminalize it."2 °2
Thus, by justifying the criminalization of IP rights based on the
specialized private interests, Congress "give[s] little regard [to]
the moral force that makes [the laws] effective in the first
place."2"3 As a public instrument responsible for implementing the
codes that society has deemed harmful and condemnable,
government prosecutors must implement the PRO-IP Act that
reconciles the purpose of the Act with the traditional presumptions
underlying criminal law. The DOJ has the authority to decide
which cases to pursue, and this discretionary power could enable
the Federal government to effectively combat the harms addressed
in the PRO-IP Act without undermining individual freedoms and
the public's access to IP.

E. Restoring Boundaries and Balance in CriminalIP Law
In order for the government to create a meaningful progress in
202. Lawrence Lessig, In Defense of Piracy, WALL ST. J. (New York),
October 11, 2008, at 3.
203. Moohr, supra note 152, at 782.
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the long term effectiveness of criminal IP laws and to establish a
more balanced policy of IP owner rights and public access, the
DOJ needs to implement the law that targets the behavior and not
the property. The key is to set clearer boundaries between civil
and criminal IP sections and the DOJ must be clear to limit its role
in the criminal realm.
First, the DOJ must create a more concrete basis for its
guidelines in deciding which IP cases to prosecute. Currently, the
DOJ's IP manual provides general factors for attorneys to consider
when charging crimes such as federal law enforcement priorities,
the nature and seriousness of the offense, and the adequacy of
alternative remedies. 2"
However, the DOJ's press releases
demonstrates the divergent nature of IP crimes ranging from the
theft of trade secrets to the sale of counterfeited movies2. 5 which
could result in widely discretionary prosecutions without any
specified policy objectives. As diverse areas of criminal IP law
become more established in the government's policies, the DOJ
needs to create an experienced foundation through case law on
which it may build a coherent and consistent policy of deterrence
in the diverse areas of IP offenses. Yet, the DOJ is relatively
complacent in prosecuting IP crimes: the manual instructs that
"Federal prosecution is most appropriate when the questions of IP
laws are most settled."2 6 Complacency with the current law does
not provide clearer insight into the problems underlying criminal
IP law.
Second, comprehensive guidelines must also be established for
the evidentiary and procedural boundaries of prosecuting an IP
offense. The current government IP manual only provides
cautionary rules on prosecutorial ethics regarding the use of
private help from the IP owners.0 7 Recently, a DOJ press release
on a case which the defendant, who sold counterfeit movies in a
flea market, publicly acknowledged that the FBI jointly
investigated the case with the United States Anti-Piracy

204. DOJ IP MANUAL, supra 160, at 304.
205. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Intellectual Property News
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipnews.html
206. DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 305.
207. Id.
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Operations Division of the MPAA. °8 In light of this open reality
of IP law where private and government investigations often
merge, a more comprehensive study into the possible evidentiary
and procedural implications of such investigatory methods in the
unique context of IP law must be made.
Furthermore, in
criminalizing counterfeited IP goods, the ultimate end should be to
punish and deter behavior. Government should actively pursue
prison sentences rather than fines, as the DOJ acknowledges:
"Some infringers are undeterred by civil liability. They treat civil
remedies as a cost of doing business and continue their
infringement after civil sanctions."2 "9 Therefore, to the extent it
protects the IP rights of particular victims, the DOJ must be clear
that its responsibility is to focus on the harm caused rather than the
property diverted.
Finally, the DOJ and IP owners do need to collaborate in
creating a more meaningful dialogue with the public beyond the
mere prosecution of cases. While there may be collaboration
between the government and IP owners when it comes to
investigating IP offenses, there is a lack of communication when it
comes to looking toward the future of IP law. The PRO-IP Act
seeks more effective use of resources between businesses, local
law enforcement, and the DOJ to implement private and
governmental policies of IP law. Section IV grants IP-TIC grants
for local investigators and prosecutors to create their own units in
pursing IP crime.2"' A more localized focus on IP enforcement
creates a more intimate connection with the public at large and
holds the potential to create more awareness and persuasively
educate the public.
Thus, given the extremely limited
governmental resources devoted to IP enforcement, 2 ' a new
208. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Eagle Pass Man Sentenced to
Federal Prison for Selling Pirated DVDs (Feb. 3, 2009), available at

http://www.cybercrime.gov/martinezSent2.pdf.
209. DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 160, at 306. Throughout the chapter, the
DOJ emphasizes that civil liability does not deter behavior. See id. at 306, 308.
210. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4271.
211. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, S. 3325,
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACT OF 2008 3 (2008),

available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/98xx/doc9861/s3325.pdf. According
to the estimate appropriate for Title V of the PRO-IP Act, $ 25 million would be
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

41

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

396

DEPAULJ.ART, TECH. &IPLAW

[Vol. XIX:2

paradigm and balance could be achieved through a more
encompassing communication through the shared resources of the
general public, IP owners, and the government.
V. CONCLUSION

Unless the fundamental policies and attitudes underlying
criminal IP law change, the PRO-IP Act is merely a superficial
bandage that will fail to deter IP offenses and create problematic
implications for prosecutorial authority. An examination of
Congress's policy for protecting IP owners demonstrates that the
property paradigm is ineffective in deterring IP infringement and
conduct. Counterfeited products cannot necessarily be seen as loss
to the IP owner, yet forfeiture and restitution are tools in which the
IP owner may be entitled to capture all benefits arising from his
ideas. However, these provisions further blur the boundaries
between civil and criminal IP law and jeopardizes the DOJ's
prosecutorial authority by allowing the manipulation of civil tools
in criminal prosecution. In the long term, these uncertain
boundaries undermine the DOJ's potential to shape a more
balanced IP policy that reconciles Congress's and the public's
perceptions of harm and that effectuates the ultimate purpose of
respecting both IP owner's rights and public access to IP. Thus,
while restitution and forfeiture may punish an individual offender
and thwart the immediate offense, these tools fail to address the
continuing problems underlying the criminalization of IP law. The
existing property conceptualization of IP rights is inadequate in
addressing the realities of criminal law enforcement. A new
paradigm that includes the public voice is necessary in order to
establish a balanced and sustainable foundation for criminal IP
law.
Grace Pyun

allocated annually between 2009-2013 for special CHIP and FBI training and
$25 million annually between 2009-2013 for local IP-TIC grants. Id.
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